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ABSTRACT

We investigate the effects of higher tariffs on the current account.
Tariffs may increase or decrease investment depending on the capital intensity
of the sector protected.

We find that the response of saving to tariffs is

sensitive to the modelling of saving behavior·.

·In a model in which consumers'

discount rate varies endogenously (in the Uzawa preference form), saving falls
with higher tariffs.

This result may, however, be reversed in the

Blanchard-Yaari type model in which consumers have uncertain lifetimes.

We

find that in both models the response of saving depends on a production
distortion effect which changes steady-state income and an effect on
steady-state expenditures.

Charles Engel and Kenneth Kletzer, "Tariffs, Saving and the Current Account"

Tariffs, Saving, and the Current Account*

Tariffs are frequently proposed as a policy to reduce or eliminate
current account deficits.

This paper explores the effectiveness of those

policies for a small country in the context of a two-sector neoclassical
growth model.

We find it less insightful to examine the current account when

written in its net exports form.

A naive analysis leads one to conclude that

since tariffs reduce imports, there must be a tendency to improve the current
account.

This is a very partial equilibrium viewpoint that ignores

adjustments throughout the economy.

In static neoclassical trade models (in

which the current account is zero by assumption) shifts in production and
consumption patterns ensure that any reduction in imports is matched by an
equal drop in exports.

In a large class of macroeconomic models with flexible

exchange rates the tariff also has no impact on the current account, because
an exchange rate appreciation will immediately offset all changes from higher
tariffs.

To understand the long run consequences of tariff policies, we want

to consider the components of the current account in its saving less
investment form.

This-allows us to see clearly that if a tariff is to r~duce

a current account deficit it must have the effect of decreasing the country•s
international borrowing.
We concentrate mainly on how tariffs change the level of saving.

The

response of saving is found to be sensitive to the specific modelling of
saving behavior.

In particular, we compare saving behavior in two popular

intertemporal optimizing models of small open economies - the endogenous
discount rate approach of Uzawa (1968) (which has been taken in the
international context by Obstfeld (1981, 1982) among others) and the uncertain
lifetime model of Blanchard (1985) and Yaari (1965).

In some respects, the

saving functions derived from these models are quite similar.

Both assume

that savers maximize utility over an i nfi ni te hori zo~, and both generate
•This paper contains elements of a study that was prepared for the
AEI/NBER pre-conference on Real and Financial Linkages in Open Economies, June
1985. We would like to thank Dani Rodrik and Jonathan Eaton for useful
comments.
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Metzlerian saving equations in which the•level of saving is proportional to
the difference between some target level of wealth and current wealth.

Yet,

the response of national saving to tariffs can be quite different in the two
formulations.

The target wealth level will change according to two effects

that we identify - a steady-state expenditure effect and a production
distortion effect.
tariff levels rise.

The distortion effect always works to increase saving when
In the Uzawa-type model tariffs also increase saving

through the expenditure effect, in contrast to the uncertain lifetime model in
which the expenditure effect may lead to lower saving as tariffs go up.
Our small open economy consists of two sectors - one that produces a good
that can be used either for current consumption or for investment, and the
other being a pure consumption good.

The composite good is manufactured with

labor and capital, while the pure consumption good uses labor and land in its
production.

This particular structure was chosen because it represents the

simplest possible arrangement that allows a capital good to be produced and
traded, and that allows international borrowing. 1 It is well known that.the
more familiar two sector models in which labor and capital are used to produce
both goods yield, in general, an indeterminate capital stock when foreign
borrowing is permitted. 2
The model is dynamic, since international borrowing is inherently not a
static phenomenon.

Furthermore, we examine the dynamics of the current

account over an infinite span of time.

Another approach would have been to

look at a two-period model of the economy, but there are drawbacks to such a
tact.

It is impossible in the two-period world to distinguish between the

short-run and long-run effects of policy changes.

Also, the two-period view

can be limiting when trying to study the dynamics of borrowing.
borrowed today must be paid back with interest in that set-up.

A dollar
With an
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infinite horizon, the principal on the loan never needs to be paid back - the
present-value of the stream of interest payments equals the value of the
principal.
Since we wish to focus on the effect of tariffs on saving, we have
assumed that there are no costs to adjusting the capital stock.

Thus, the

entire investment response occurs on impact when the tariff rates change.

If

the tariff is placed on the pure consumption good then production of that good
expands, drawing labor out of the composite good sector.

This lowers the

marginal productivity of capital in that sector, thus making capital a less
attractive asset than foreign bonds.

Capital is immediately traded

internationally for bonds until the marginal productivity of capital increases
into equality with the world interest rate.

If the tariff were levied on the

composite good the opposite reaction would occur - there would be an immediate
export of foreign bonds for capital.

Thus, the impact effect from investment

changes on the current account depends on which good the tariff is levied.
Countries that are small in international capital markets, and in wh,ich
individuals are infinitely lived and have constant discount rates, cannot
reach a steady-state with non-zero wealth unless the knife-edge condition is
met that the discount rate at home equals the world interest rate.

The Yaari

Blanchard model endogenizes the interest rate, in a sense which will be made
clear later.

The Uzawa-Obstfeld approach assumes the discount rate changes in

response to changes in expenditure levels.

Both models yield a saving

equation near the steady-state that can be written as

s =

e(a -

a)'
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wheres is saving, a is tradeable a~sets {capital·plus bonds) and i is the
steady-state level of a.

Since a cannot change immediately when tariffs are

imposed (capital can only be acquired through borrowing in the very short
run), the effect on saving of a tariff is directly related to the effect on
steady-state holdings of tradeable assets.

The response of

a to

the tariff,

however, may be very different in the two models.
At this point it is worth emphasizing that we are interested only in the
positive question of how tariffs affect the current account in a small
economy, and do not examine welfare questions.
Section 2 sets up the model and explores the effects of tariffs on
investment.

In section 3, the response of saving to a tariff on the pure

consumption good is explored when consumers have Uzawa preferences, while the
same issue is dealt with in section 4 under the assumption that consumers have
uncertain lifetimes.
composite good.

Section. 5 takes up briefly the case of a tariff on the

Conclusions are drawn in the final section.

Much of the

formal mathematics is included in an appendix.

2.

The Model

There are two goods produced in our model - a pure consumption good and a
composite good that can be consumed or used as an investment good.

The

composite good, which is labelled good 1, uses capital and labor in its
production.

The production function is assumed to be constant returns to

scale, and output is given by

•

C
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y 1 = kf(x/k)
where k is the stock of capital and xis the amount of labor employed in
Output in the second industry uses land and labor in its

industry 1.

production, and the technology is again constant returns to scale.

Labor is

mobile between i-ndustries and it is assumed that the total labor supply as
well as the total land stock are fixed at 1.

y

2

We can write

= g(l - x) •

Capital depreciates at a rate n, so

i = k - nk

where i equals the rate of investment.
The current account is equal to the trade surplus added to interest
earned on holdings of foreign bonds.

( 1)

We have

b = rb - • ,

where bis domestic holdings of foreign assets,. is the trade deficit and r
is the given world interest rate.

This equation says that the current account

surplus equals the rate of accumulation of foreign assets.
For the economy as a whole
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y 1 + PY 2 = z + i - • ,

(2)

where z is the value of total current consumption expenditure on the two goods
(valued at world prices) by domestic residents, and pis the world price of
good 2.

This simply states that the value of output equals consumption plus

investment less the trade deficit.

(There is no government sector per se.

Tariff revenue is redistributed back to consumers with lump-sum transfers.)
It is convenient at this point to introduce the notation

t - x/k •

Competitive asset markets and the free mobility of capital internationally
ensures that bonds and physical capital offer the same rate of return:

The right side of the equation is the net marginal productivity of capital.
For a given world rate of interest and depreciation rate this equation implies
tis fixed over time.
Since labor is mobile between sectors, the marginal productivity of labor
will be equalized in the two industries:

Here, pis the domestic price of good 2, which will differ from the world
price if tariffs are in place.

Except at the instant of a change in the
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tariff rate,

p does not change over time. Given that

J.

is fixed from eq. (3),

the capital stock k will only change at the moment the tariff is altered.

So,

k = 0 ,

and

i = nk •

This country may be net importers of both goods, only one good or neither
good at any point in time.

From eq. (4)

dk/dp = g 1 /ipg 11 < 0 •

If the tariff on the pure consumption good is increased, the capital stock
falls.

This occurs because production of good 2 increases, drawing labor out

of sector 1 which is the capital-using industry.
drop in the marginal productivity of capital.
is traded for foreign bonds.

So, there is an incipient

Disinvestment occurs as capital

If the tariff on the pure consumption good is

lowered--or, equivalently, the tariff on the composite good is raised--the
capital stock increases.
We can see now that the direction of the investment effect on the current
account of a change in the level of protection depends upon which good the
tariff is levied.

If the capital-using good is protected, investment

increases and the current account falls.

The current account balance will go

up, on the other hand, if tariffs on the good that uses land and labor in its
production are raised.

'·
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In this set-up the capital stock can change d1scretely.

If investment is

to occur over time there must be some rigidity that prevents the immediate
adjustment of the stock of capital.

A popular, though somewhat ad hoc, way of

modelling this is to impose adjustment costs for both increasing and
decreasing the capital stock.

A more natural way of allowing gradual

investment and disinvestment is to assume capital, once in place, cannot be
moved.

Disinvestment could take place only at the rate of depreciation.

investment could only occur as new capital goods are produced.

New

A small

country might reasonably be able to meet its capital needs in a very short
period of time with capital imports, since its desired investment might be a
small fraction of current production of capital goods.

However, a large

country could not increase its capital stock quickly since its desired
investment might exceed current investment goods production.
Another direction in which the model of investment could be altered is to
allow a more general production structure.

For example, we might allow all

three factors to move between tndustries.

In this case, if the elastici~ies

of substitution between factors are equal in the two industries, then
protection of a good will unambiguously lead to an increase (decrease) in the
capital stock if that industry uses a larger (smaller) share of the country's
capital stock than its share of the supply of labor or land.

If there are

more goods and factors, some weaker general results are available in Ruffin
(1984) and the references cited therein.
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3.

Saving in the Uzawa-Obstfeld Model

In this sector we will consider a model with a representative consumer
who has Uzawa preferences.

We will assume the pure consumption good is

protected and look at the effects on saving of increasing the level of
protection.
At any moment in time, current felicity depends on consumption of both
goods - u(c 1, c2). It is convenient~ however, to express the level of
felicity by the indirect utility function

where I represents the level of expenditure at any given time, expressed in
terms of domestic prices.
A consumer maximizes the integral

where
t

6.t =

f0

6

s

ds

and 6 s is the instantaneous subjective discount rate at times.
Uzawa, we take o to be a function of utility at times:
s

Following
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As in Uzawa, we assume

o

>

o, o'

>

o, o - o'v

>

o, o"

>

o.

Consumers choose their level of expenditure and the trade deficit subject
to the constraints imposed by eq. (1) and the budget constraint

( 5)

where R is tariff revenue distributed to the individual.

Consumers take Ras
From eqs. (2)

given and do not perceive that their choices alter its level.
and (5) we see

The aggregate model is s~own in the Appendix to be characterized by.
saddle stability.

Therefore, near the steady-state we have

.

b = el (b - b) ,

el > 0

where -e 1 is the negative eigenvalue of the dynamic system.
assets a to be

Define tradeable

a = b + k •

Since equation (4) tells us capital is fixed over time, k =
write

r.:K.

Thus, we can
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b =

(6)

e(a -

a) •

This is a particularly useful equation to analyze.

It represents the

accumulation of foreign bonds over time - i.e., the current account.

The

current account just equals saving, because all investment changes occur
discretely at a point in time.
The level of a is given to the economy at any given time.

Capital can be

traded for bonds, and vice-versa, but their sum can only change over time.

Thus, if tariffs are to affect saving it can only be through effects on a.
According to equation (6), as irises so does saving and the current account.
Given our assumptions on the mobility of international capital, any model
of saving that has a stable steady-state will yield a saving equation such as
(6) near the steady-state.

However, different models of saving behavior may

imply that the target level of traded assets

a responds

differently as tariffs

are increased.
From eqs. (1) and (2), we ·have that in steady-state when b = 0,

Therefore,

It is useful to look at the change in the two bracketed terms on the
right side of eq. (7) separately.
with an increase in tariffs.

We would like to know how each term changes

First let us note
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= f (I) -

ptg(l - x)

= r + n +

(p -

p ).t g ' ( 1 - x) •

Remembering that i

The last step uses eqs. (3) and (4).

=

nk, we then have

= -[(p - p)_tg'(l - x)/r]dk/dp •

This derivative is positive because

p

> p and dk/dp < O.

We see that from the first term of eq. (7), steady-state holdings of
traded assets must rise with an increase in the tariff on the pure consumption
good.

Intuitively, in order to maintain the same level of income in steady

state after the tariff is imposed, the capital that is shipped abroad must be
replaced by bonds.

But, in fact, the economy needs to replace the capital

with more than an equal amount of bonds to generate the same level of
income.

With a tariff already in place there was a distortion that caused the

economy to have a lower capital stock than it would under free trade.

An

increase in the tariff worsens the distortion as it moves more resources to
the protected sector.

So, to maintain the same level of income, bonds must be

imported not only to offset the lost capital but atso to counteract the
a9gravation of the distortion.

We call th1s effect on steady-state holdings
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of b + k the distort ion effect, and it causes

a to

rise with an increas e in

the tariff rate irrespe ctive of the model of saving behavior.
The second term in eq. (7) involves the steady -state level of
expend iture, z. If consumers have the endogenous discount rate of Uzawa
prefere nces, then over time expend iture adjusts so that in the steady state
the discoun t rate equals the world rate of interes t:

o(v(I, p)) = r •

The steady -state level of felicit y is determined by this relatio nship, and
will not change if a tariff is imposed. (Thus, all welfare loss from the
imposition of a tariff comes along the transit ion to the steady -state, but not
in the steady -state itself. )
An increas e in the tariff rate will raise the long-run level of
expend iture at world prices. Figure 1 demonstrates this increa.se in
expend iture for a finite tariff startin g from free trade.

Before the tariff,

steady -state consumption is at point a, and the expenditure is z. With the
tariff, consumers set their marginal rate of substit ution equal to the
domestic price given by the slope of the dotted line.

So, in order to

maintain the same long-run felicit y, expend iture rises to z'.

This same point

can be demonstrated mathematically by using proper ties of expedi ture
functio ns.

Then

We can define

z

Figure 1
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Holding felicity constant

= (p -

p) I22

>0 •

We see that steady-state expenditure rises when the tariff increases.
Thus, in this model

both the distortion effect and the expenditure effect

contribute to higher saving as tariffs go up.

In the next section, we will

see that in the uncertain lifetime model steady-state expenditure falls with a
raise in the tariff rate.

4.

Saving in the Yaari-Blanchard Model

In this section we take up a model in which there is a continuum of
agents, each of whom faces a constant probability of death~of time a new cohort of size~ is born.

At each instant

The population is constant and has a

size equal to 1.
Each agent can own physical wealth in the form of bonds, capital or
claims on land.

Since these assets are perfect substitutes, they all earn the

world rate of interest r.

In addition, each agent is assumed to make a deal
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with an insurance company that he receive an additional rate of return~
from the company if he lives, but that the company receive his physical wealth
Conversely, if the individual has net holdings of physical wealth

if he dies.

less than zero, he agrees to pay a premium rate of~ per unit of debt on the
condition the insurance company assumes his debt if he dies.

The expected

profit for the insurance company is zero.
There are _two types of wealth that are assumed not transferable to the
insurance company for an annuity.

The individual 1 s human wealth (the

discounted value of labor income) has no value upon death, so the insurance
company is unwilling to pay anything to have the privilege of owning this
asset after the person's death.
tariff revenue after death.

Similarly, the individual has no claim on

Tariff revenue is distributed only to living

persons, and not to anybody's estate.
Individuals are assumed to maximize expected utility, which, given the
constant probability of death implies they maximize

They face the constraint

(8)

v1. = ( r
1

+ ~ )w.1 + f 1 (1) + R - I.1

where wi is the value of n,on-human wealth owned by individual i.

(9)

w = b + k +p(g - (1 - x)g'(l - x))/r.

That is,
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The last term in eq. (9) represents the value of land.

This can be seen by

noting that the return to owning a unit of land is p(g - (1 - x)g'(l - x))
plus n times the value of a unit of land.
We make an additional restriction on preferences in this section in order
to be able to aggregate individual consumption into an aggregate consumption
In particular, we assume that preferences are homothetic and can be

function.

written in constant relative risk aversion form:

The Appendix shows that aggregate expenditure is proportional to wealth
of all forms:

where

t = r + n: - (r - o)/r:J •

Human wealth is given by f'(t)/(r + n).
tariff revenue and z - I.

The term

-(p -

p)y 2 is the sum of

It represents the cost to the individual of a

tariff - he receives revenue R, but the price of good 2 is higher.
For the types of wealth with which the individual cannot purchase an
annuity, there is no difference between the rate of return for society and the
individual.

They might both be discounted at a rater+ n.

the value of these assets is [f'(t) on these assets is simply f' (1) -

(p -

(p -

p)y 2 JJ(r +n).

So, we can say
The rate of return

p)y 2• On the other hand, the rate of
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return on physical wealth for society is only r.

The -annuity payment

merely a transfer from the insurance company to individuals.

1t

is

Thus, for

society

(11)

W: rw + f I (J.) -

(p -

P)y 2 -

Z

•

This economy can reach a steady-state even though it faces a given world
interest rate and has a constant discount rate.
return on assets varies endogenously.
is rand on non-tangible assets r + 1t.
portfolio is r +
As

A

1tA,

where

A

In a sense, the total rate of

The rate of return on physical wealth
The total return on the economy's

is the share of wealth in non-tangible assets.

changes over time, the economy-wide rate of return adjusts.
If r <~then the system is saddle-stable, and

Unlike the previous section, this equation holds globally (not just near the
steady-state) because of our constant relative risk aversion assumption.

Once

again, we can write

because the capital stock jumps immediately to its long run value.
tariff will raise the current account if it causes

a to

So, the

jump up •.

Eqs. (2), (3), (4), (5) and (9) can be used to show that the asset
accumulation equation (11) above is equi va 1ent to eq. (1).

Thus, there is no
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difference from the previous section·in the expression for the long-run level
of traded assets

As before, the distortion effect will imply an increase in the tariff and will

a to

cause

go up.

Steady-state expenditures can be derived from eqs. (10) and (11) when
~

= O.

These expenditures are simply proportional to the value of what we

have called non-tangible assets:

In this model, long run expenditures fall as the tariff is increased:
dz/dp = [t:.1t (t:. - r )( r + 1t) J[1 (p

-

p) g 1

~

-

g] •

dp

Here, at any point in time consumption is proportional to wealth - much as in
a permanent income model.

The steady-state requires that w be proportional to

non-tangible assets, which in turn implies steady-state consumption
expenditures are proportional to the value of non-tangible assets.

Since the

value of these assets falls with a tariff, so does long-run expenditure.
So, in the Yaari-Blanchard world of uncertain lifetimes and a constant
discount rate, the distortion and expenditure effects of a change in tariffs
work in opposite directions on the current account.

The expenditure effect

may in fact dominate the distortion effect, so higher tariffs could cause a
decrease in the current account balance.
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5.

Tariffs on the Composite Good

In this section we will briefly trace through the effects of a tariff on
the composite good.
section.

The results are not too different from the previous

The only change is that in the Yaari-Blanchard model the sign of the

expenditure effect is indeterminate.
It is useful in this section to change numeraires so that expenditure
levels are expressed in terms of the pure consumption good.

{ 12)

So, we now have

z = PY l + y 2 + P't - pi

and

We will also express the value of bonds and the current account in terms of
good 2:

(14)

.

b = rb + pyl + y2 - z - pi

This implies that in steady-state, when b = 0, long-run bond holdings are
given by

We now write the labor market equilibrium as:

pf'(J.)

=

g'(l - kJ.).

20

Both models are saddle-stable again, under the same set•of assumptions.
So, foreign bond accumulation can once again be expressed as

b

=

e(b - b) , e > 0 •

The capital stock will equal its long-run value at all times, so

b = e(a - a) ,

(15)

where

a= b + pk •

It follows that the tariff will affect saving only to the extent it influences
a.

The steady-state level of

a=

(16)

a is

given by

[pk+ (pi - py 1 - y 2 )/r]

+

[z/r] •

Taking the change in the term in the first bracket in eq. (16) will yield
the distortion effect.

It is again positive, so that higher tariffs tend to

lead to h~gher levels of i, and a higher current balance, through this
channel.

=

[(p - p}J.f 1 (1)/r]dk/dp.
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This derivative is greater than zero ~ecause p > p and dk/dp > O.
In the model with Uzawa preferences, the increase in tariffs again leads
to a higher steady-state expenditure level.

The current account rises from

both the distortion effect and the expenditure effect.

Formally, the long-run

felicity level is determined by the condition

o(v(I, p))

=

r.

Now, let us define

Then

Holding felicity constant

= (p - p)Ill > 0 •

In the uncertain lifetime formulation, aggregate expenditure is given

by

22

where

w = b +pk+ (g - (1 - ik))g')/r.

(18)

(p -

p)(i - y1 ) again
represents the change in the individual consumer's income from the tariff,

Human wealth is given by pf'(i)/(r + ~).

The term

equalling the sum of tariff revenue and z - I.
Saving is given by the relation

w = rw + pf'(i) +

(19)

(p -

p)(i - y 1 ) - z •

Eqs. (12), (13) and (18) can be used to show that equation (19) is identical
to eq. (14).

Thus, eq. (16) gives the steady-state holdings of

a in

this

model.
We can use eqs. (18) and (19) to solve for long run consumption
expenditures:

The change in z- from an increase in the tariff on the composite good is given
by:

23

dz/dp = [cm/(tl - r)(r + rc)][(p - p)(n - f(J.)) dk
dp

- (kf(i) - f'(t) - nk)] • .

The first tenn in the second bracket is negative because f(t) >non the
assumption that the world interest rate is positive.

This means the entire

expression for dz/dp is less than zero if (kf(t) - f'(t) - nk) is positive.
This condition will be met if capital 1 s income exceeds the income of labor
employed in the consumption goods sector.
The expenditure effect on steady-state traded asset holdings can be
negative (though it need not be).
distortion effect.

If it is negative, it may outweigh the

So, once again in the uncertain lifetime model raising

tariffs may lower the current account balance.

6.

Conclusions

We have examined in this paper how the current account responds to
increases in the level of protection, according to two popular models for
small economies that can borrow·intjrnationally.

The two models--the Uzawa

Obstfeld endogenous time preference set-up and the Yaari-Blanchard uncertain
lifetime formulation--have much in common.

Both assume consumers have

foresight and optimize; and both, under the proper set of assumptions,
describe economies that converge to a steady-state.

Yet, the reaction of the

current account to tariff changes can be quite dissimilar in these models.
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This conclusion is of practical importance.

There is increasing use in

the profession of general equilibrium models for small less developed
countries to try to give answers to policy questions.

These models are

empirically based, and some (such as Kharas and Shishido (1985), and Ghanem
(1985)) have allowed intertemporal optimization.

A lesson of this paper is

that some policy conclusions drawn about the effects of tariffs might be quite
sensitive to the structure of the model.

It is necessary to know whether

savers have a target level of long-run welfare or whether their expenditure
levels are just proportional to permanent income.
Although in some ways the models studied in this paper are limited, the
structure is rich enough to highlight the usefulness of the dynamic
intertemporal approach to .current account analysis.

The effect on saving of

higher tariffs is seen to depend on matters that are not at all relevant in
static or two-period models.

The impact of the tariff on the steady-state

levels of income and consumption through the distortion effect and the
expenditure effect are of primary importance.

Footnotes

1.

This model of the production side was used, for example~ by Eaton (1984a,

1984b) to study various dynamic trade issues.

2.

See, for example, Mundell (1957).
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